I, ROY EDGLEY, of 8 Norfolk Road, Brighton BN1 3AA MAKE OATH AND SAY as follows:-
1. I am an independent expert witness in this action and I make this affidavit in support of Mr. Andrew Malcolm's claim for damages to be assessed as ordered by the Court of Appeal on 18th December 1990.
2. I was a university teacher of philosophy for 27 years, until I took early retirement in 1981. Having graduated with a first-class honours degree in philosophy at Manchester University in 1952, I did a B.Phil. at Oxford under Gilbert Ryle, 1952-1954. From 1951 was successively assistant lecturer, lecturer, and senior lecturer in philosophy at Bristol University. In 1970 I was appointed professor of philosophy at Sussex University, a post I held till my retirement. I have written and published a book, Reason in Theory and Practice (Hutchinson 1969), and a couple of dozen articles (mostly in learned journals). I have edited a series of philosophy books, Philosophy Now, and I have edited and written the introduction to a collection of philosophy articles, the first Radical Philosophy Reader.
3. I have read Andrew Malcolm's Making Names and think it an exceptional piece of work. It is recognisably a book of philosophy. In it most of the major philosophical problems are presented and argued about: empiricist epistemology, the mind-body problem, causality, freedom and determinism, universals, language and reality, ethics, theology, physics and metaphysics. But though the range of topics is standard and familiar, Malcolm's treatment of these topics is highly unusual both in its content and in its presentation.
4. The most obvious departure from the norm is that the book takes the form of a dialogue. Of course Plato wrote philosophy in the form of dialogue, as did occasionally Bishop Berkeley in the early eighteenth century. But the form is rare, despite its suitablity to what some philosophers regard as the intrinsically dialectical character of philosophical argument. Moreover, Malcolm's use of dialogue is in certain ways more fully dramatic than Plato's or Berkeley's. Interspersed in the dialogue are brief passages of narrative that set the scene for the discussion. Further, each disputant quite often gives way to emotional outbursts, such as exasperation at the obtuseness of the other, at his own bewilderment, or rapture at the beauty of the scenery; and they refer from time to time to their women-folk and families. The effect of all this is to keep our feet on the ground while the philosophical content of the conversation reaches the highest levels of abstraction: to remind us of what philosophy tempts us to forget, ordinary everyday life, its inescapable reality.
5. But it's not until the final chapter that Malcolm's fusion of philosophy and drama takes its most audacious step. Here, at what can only be called the climax of the book, Malcolm presents us with his own rhyming and half-rhyming version of the tragedy of Electra. This is enacted in harness with the operation of a large-scale working model of the modern theory of the sub-atomic structure of matter, the point of this extraordinary combination being to illustrate one of his main themes, the strictly mythological, or metaphysical, character of the basic theories of modern physics, and more generally the theological nature of modern science.
6. This brings me to the content of the book. Malcolm has many interesting things to say, more or less new or unusual, about the philosophical problems he tackles, and though he mentions other philosophers rather little, his arguments continually bear, usually in a critical way, on their views. In this regard, I found chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8 all very fruitful, in particular for their relations to Wittgenstein on the theory of language and Feyerabend on the philosophy of science. Like Wittgenstein he is fascinated by and knowledgeable about language, and like Feyerabend (and unlike many philosophers of science) he clearly knows a good deal of modern physics, which I guess he must have had some training in.
I conclude that the book would be of great interest to professional philosophers, and I imagine that physicists and other scientists would also find it worth studying. But its appeal would go well beyond that rather select readership. Malcolm's writing is fluent and, given the difficulty of the topics, wonderfully easy to read. This, together with its dramatic style, its humour, its total lack of academic formality and fustiness, would extend its accessibility to students. I mean students in general: university, open university, and polytechnic students in fields other than just philosophy, but also students still at school, especially now that philosophy is making its way onto the school curriculum. It has been said that Bertrand Russell had the rare ability to write books that were both original contributions to philosophy and at the same time introductions for beginners, e.g. The Problems of Philosophy. It seems to me that Malcolm has something of that kind of talent. It's even possible, I suppose, that his book might gain some degree of 'popular' readership. I certainly found it a good read, and I think others would too.
SWORN BY ROY EDGLEY, in Brighton, 17th June 1991
Official transcription by Palantype Ltd, 2 Frith Road, Croydon CR0 1TA
Professor ROY EDGLEY, sworn, examined by Mr Malcolm before CHANCERY MASTER BARRATT
Malcolm: I shall not ask you to go through all you have written, but I invite you firstly to amplify your suggestion that the book makes it makes some original contributions.
Edgley: Its most obvious mode of making an original contribution to philosophy is the type of presentation - the dramatic structure of the book. It is a dialogue. That of course is nothing new, but there are not many philosophers who have used the dialogue form - Plato and Berkeley are certainly amongst them. It is also much more richly dramatic than their versions of philosophical dialogue because there is a good deal of narrative in it. The disputants express strong feelings and emotions; they get distracted by what is going on around them, and so on.
Ultimately there is the last chapter, which is a very striking presentation of ideas in the form of Mr Malcolm's half-rhyming version of the tragedy of Electra which is produced in combination with a large-scale model of particle physics, to make the general point that there is a strong connection between these two apparently very different things.
First of all, the book is very odd and unusual in its dramatic content, in one form or another, and its dramatic mode of presentation. One of the functions of this, it seems to me, is to remind us that although philosophical argument can become very abstract and reach extremely high levels of theory, argument is always something that goes on as an inter-personal exchange in common circumstances - games of cricket, scenery, houses and so on. It is a constant reminder of the ordinary, everyday context of these rather abstract and peculiar speculations.
It seems to me that there are also two actual original contributions to philosophical problems in this book. One of the most striking of these is the account of Wittgenstein and his theory of universals, his theory of family resemblances. There is a criticism of this theory which is quite striking and would be of general interest to professional philosophers. Another contribution is in the field of ethics, where he takes a famous argument of Hume's about 'ought' and 'is' and points out that Hume himself perpetrates this kind of inference which, explicitly, he is disallowing. This was certainly new to me and again, I think, would be of considerable interest to professional philosophers.
His general position in philosophy is that he is a monist. He believes that dualism is wrong, that is the idea that there is a fundamental distinction between mind and matter, as in Descartes' theories. But he does not opt for either of the standard monisms, that is either materialism or idealism. He produces a theory which is a peculiar combination of materialism and idealism. Again, that seems to me to be well worth the attention of professional philosophers. I suspect that historically speaking his theory has Aristotelian roots, but I'm not sufficiently well versed in Aristotle to be quite sure of that and I do not think that Mr Malcolm was aware of this anyway.
Finally, there is a striking account of the language of modern particle physics which connects it with theology. I find this a very daring proposal. The way has been prepared for it in a sense by recent discussion in the philosophy of science by people like Kuhn, Feyerabend and, a bit earlier, Popper. However, the specific form of the argument is, I think, unique and here again would be a contribution that could be of great interest to professional philosophers.
I strongly disagree with Dr Mynott (Oxford's independent witness) and also, incidentally, with Alan Ryan and Galen Strawson, who seemed to think that the chief claim of the book as a work of philosophical argument is with respect to beginners or students. I do not think that is the case. It would have a readership among professional philosophers and, certainly, amongst philosophy students.
On the other hand, although it makes these contributions to philosophy, it also has a direct appeal and accessibility to non-philosophers and beginners - not perhaps quite the appeal that Nagel envisages in his book [What Does It All Mean?] (I think that they must be about 10 years old). His book is of extreme simplicity, beautifully written and easy to read, but also very simple. Malcolm's book is extremely complicated. It is very rich, but it is accessible to students because it will keep them entertained (this is partly a function of the way in which it is organised as a dramatic dialogue), and also because it is very lucidly written. It is extraordinarily easy to read and even non-philosophers would agree with this. They might find that catching up with all that is going on is a bit difficult and they would have to go back a bit here and there, but it is a kind of prose which carries one along. I read it very quickly, although I am not normally a quick reader, and found it fascinating and interesting. I think that a lot of other people would find it fascinating and interesting too, even those who were not professional philosophers
I take my Mynott's point that it is written for everyone and no-one. In a sense it is written for everyone, but in a perfectly acceptable sense. It makes claim to be a general book, even though it is also an original piece of philosophy. This is not entirely peculiar in the history of philosophy books. Bertrand Russell's The Problems of Philosophy in 1912 was often said to have the distinction of being both an introductory book and an original contribution to philosophy. This is true of Malcolm's book, though in a very different way. It is totally unorthodox and this distinguishes it sharply from all the other books which have been compared with it, which are in various obvious ways orthodox books of philosophy - books of orthodox analytical philosophy where arguments of high abstraction are presented and the discussion is conducted at that level of abstraction all time: this is the world of academic philosophy.
Malcolm is doing something very different. He is saying in effect that philosophical argument is a kind of opposition between people, engaging their emotions, their everyday ideas and competing in their attention with other things going on in the environment. He is an extreme realist in this sense and he has done something in this book which is unique. I should be very sad if it were not published. It ought to see the light of day and it would create quite a stir if it did.
Malcolm: Thank you. I am lost for words.
Edgley: I may say that I wrote my report before having read anything of Strawson's and Ryan's. I did not know that they existed when I first read the book.
Malcolm: And you did not know that I existed either.
Edgley: No, not until about a week or so before that. I have known you about four weeks.
Barratt: Do you want to ask anything at this stage before he is cross-examined?
Malcolm: I do not think so Master. I think he has said it all.
Professor ROY EDGLEY cross-examined by Mr McGregor
McGregor: I have only a few minutes of questions, I am sure you'll be pleased to know. I appreciate your view of the book and I am sorry that you had been kept waiting all day to put your views, but I am sure that you understood the difficulties.
Edgley: Yes.
McGregor: People take different views and I do not want to combat your view of the book, but you are not a publisher are you?
Edgley: No, certainly not.
McGregor: You would find it difficult to assess what sort of sales the book would make?
Edgley: I personally would find it impossible to assess that. I simply concern myself with the interest of the book and its philosophical, literary and intellectual merits and ask myself what sort of people would be intrigued, interested and attracted to it.
McGregor: But you have no idea really how it would sell?
Edgley: No, I have not. But if its merit were an important part of that factor (although I agree that is not always the case), then it ought to sell well.
McGregor: Maybe students might like it but not have the money to buy it?
Edgley: That is true of most books these days, unless they are as small as Nagel's.
McGregor: You have written and published a book yourself?
Edgley: Yes.
McGregor: How many did that sell? That is a long time ago now, you probably do not remember.
Edgley: I do not know. It occasionally gets referred to in the learned journals, but I do not know how many were sold.
McGregor: I do not think I need trouble you any further.
(to the Master) to avoid difficulties on time, I will forgo a cross-examination of the other two witnesses, but I will admit the affidavits. But not Tim Hely-Hutchinson, because he was asked to come and said "I am too busy". I would ask you, if you could Master, to read Mr Ryan's affidavit overnight because he cannot be crossed-examined. He is in Princeton and we could allow that in. That should be the end of the evidence.
Barratt: Good.
McGregor: I understand that we only have Mr Nolan's affidavit in draft, and if we are to admit it we should have it sworn.
Malcolm: I have been here all day Master and cannot say whether he has managed to get it done.
Barratt: You can swear it tomorrow if necessary before we begin.
Malcolm: Yes indeed, Master.
Barratt: But it will not be admissible if it is not sworn. There are people in this building who could swear it.
Malcolm: Yes, but if he is not being cross-examined, will a faxed, a sworn version be acceptable?
Barratt: He is going to be here, is he not?
McGregor: I think he is going to say that there is no reason for him to come.
Barratt: I see.
Malcolm: Mr McGregor is forgoing cross-examination is he not?
Barratt: I thought that Mr McGregor was just not going to actually cross-examine him, but I thought his presence would still be needed, is that not so? Do you simply want me to read his affidavit? I will do that, so long as I can see that it has been sworn.
Malcolm: Would his coming here serve any purpose? He might be able to answer some of the points that have been raised today.
McGregor: (to Mr Malcolm) if you are going to start examining, I am going to cross-examine. I was trying to save time and avoid his coming. (to the Master) I do not think he is entitled to do that. If we do not require the witness to be cross-examined, the affidavit goes in, does it not? Is that not the position?
Barratt: I think that Mr Malcolm is entitled to produce his witness even if you do not wish to examine him.
McGregor: It is not that I do not wish to cross-examine, but that I am forgoing that in order to save time.
Barratt: You are offering to forgo a cross-examination if the witness is not actually here?
McGregor: That is correct.
Barratt: But if he turns up, then you will cross-examine him?
McGregor: I will cross-examine him.
Malcolm: I am sure that he will be happy not to turn up if the affidavit is sworn and accepted.
McGregor: This applies to both.
Barratt: If I can see it that his affidavit has actually been sworn, I shall read it beforehand. It may be that you will have to produce a sworn version tomorrow morning and I will then read it before everybody else comes in.
Malcolm: Very good, Master.
Barratt: Thank you very much Professor Edgley, I am sorry you had been kept waiting there for so long.
We resume at 10.30 tomorrow. Let us hope we can finish.
McGregor: I will undertake only to take half the day, if my friend only takes the other half. He starts.
Barratt: Thank you.
Go/return to Master Barratt's Damages assessment findings or to Making Names reviewed. Go also to Joseph McCarney's eloquent obituary of Roy Edgley, 1999 (takes you out of www.akme).
Go to Malcolm's Statement of Claim, to the Case History, to the Affidavits: Ivon Asquith (1); Asquith (2); Henry Hardy; William Shaw (solicitor) (1); Sir Roger Elliott (1); Margaret Goodall; to the Witness Statements: Elliott; Hardy; Richard Charkin; Nicola Bion; Goodall, to the courtroom testimony of the Oxford Six, 14/3/1990: Elliott; Goodall; Bion; Asquith; Charkin; Hardy, to the testimony of Andrew Malcolm 13/3/1990, to the CHANCERY COURT JUDGMENT, to the Cambridge package and the Adrasteia package, to the publishing contract affidavits: Giles Gordon (1); Mark Le Fanu, to the APPEAL COURT JUDGMENT, to the damages affidavits: Alan Ryan; Asquith (3); Jeremy Mynott; Giles Gordon (2); Fred Nolan; Roy Edgley, to McGregor on Royalties (transcript), to the DAMAGES FINDINGS, and to the Settlement agreement.
Return to the Malcolm vs. Oxford I (1984-92) Index, to the Malcolm vs. Oxford II (2001-02) Index, to the blurb for Making Names, to its reviews, to The Remedy, or to the SITE INDEX.